Software Supply Chain Security for Compiled, Embedded & Safety-Critical Systems

Release with evidence, not hope.

The source tree does not describe what compiles and links. Strig records what enters, happens in, and leaves the compile — the only place this supply chain is visible.

No pipeline rewrite Review the diff, not the backlog Audit-ready every build
Build inputs pass through Strig and become a signed release evidence record

What is Strig?

Strig watches the build as it runs — software supply chain security for compiled, embedded, and safety-critical systems. The source tree does not describe what actually compiles and links. Strig records that moment, then turns it into quieter reviews, prioritized risk, and signed artifacts.

The Problem

The source tree is not what shipped

Toolchain, flags, vendored code, and prebuilt binaries decide the product during the build — and nothing records it. Source tools scan a version nobody builds. Binary tools arrive after the evidence is gone.

For firmware, a bad release is a recall: a field campaign, a regulator, a safety case reopened.

The compile and link path inside a product, where build truth is decided

You cannot open what you ship

Firmware is a whole operating environment, not a package. The artifact is often proprietary, compressed, or signed — the hardest part of the system to open at all.

Nothing recorded what went in

No manifest, no lockfile. Dependencies arrive as vendored folders and blobs. Nothing records where any of it came from.

The tools are fragmented

Each one does a single check. Some checks exist in none of them: third-party binaries, toolchain authenticity, what actually linked.

A flat list is not a result

Thousands of findings are a backlog. Whether a finding matters depends on architecture and what actually built — questions the code alone cannot answer.

XZ Utils

Clean git, malicious build

The payload lived in the release build script. Source review could not have caught it.

SUNSPOT

The file that was not in git

An implant swapped a source file during compilation, then restored the clean tree. Repo checks passed.

Ripple20

A vendor blob with no trail

A vulnerable TCP/IP stack rode the supplier chain into hundreds of millions of devices.

Where coverage usually stops — and where Strig keeps watching.

01 · What you get

Build truth

A signed record of what entered, compiled, linked, and shipped — not a lockfile guess. The rest of the platform runs on that record.

See the platform
Build inputs pass through Strig and become a signed release evidence record

02 · What you get

Ranked risk

Architecture context first drops or lowers feasibility, then revises impact from damage scenarios. Risk is both — a feasible finding of low impact is not the work.

See Risk Posture
Build-to-build comparison highlighting only what changed

03 · What you get

Signed evidence

A deterministic gate and an audit pack tied to the exact binary you released. Pass or fail from policy — never from a model.

See the release gate
Deterministic release gate with a pass verdict and sealed evidence

Who it's for

Built for how you work

One question: what did we ship?

Start with Build Truth, or go straight to the full platform. See solutions

Try it on your build

Request access. Strig runs during compilation. No pipeline rewrite.